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Introduction and summary
A classic question in macroeconomics is: Why do
changes in monetary policy affect aggregate economic
activity? The answer to this question is of central im-
portance to monetary policymakers. This is because
policymakers require a convincing model of the mon-
etary transmission mechanism in order to evaluate
the consequences of alternative choices.
A key assumption in many models used to assess the
effects of monetary policy is that the nominal prices
of goods are “sticky.” By this we mean that firms do not
change their prices each period in response to the differ-
ent shocks impacting on their environment. Models em-
bodying this assumption typically have the property that
policy actions that raise the money supply and lower
short-term interest rates lead to expansions in aggregate
economic activity. These types of models are increas-
ingly being used by central banks around the world to
help guide policymakers in setting monetary policy.
Different approaches to modeling sticky prices have
been adopted in the literature. In one class of models,
referred to as time-dependent models, the number of
firms that change prices in any given period is specified
exogenously. Classic models of this sort were developed
by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Modern variants
are now central elements of a large class of models.1
A key feature of Calvo–Taylor pricing models is that
forward-looking firms understand they will only peri-
odically reoptimize prices. So, firms front load high-
er future expected real marginal costs into their current
prices. They do this because they may not be able to
raise prices when the higher marginal costs materialize.
Similarly, to avoid declines in their relative prices, firms
front load future inflation into the prices that they set.
As typically formulated, these models often imply that
deviations of economy-wide inflation from its long-run
value depend primarily on current and expected
changes in firms’ real marginal costs.
In a different class of models, often referred to as
state-dependent pricing models, the number of firms
changing prices in any given period is determined endog-
enously. Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) model this
phenomenon by assuming that firms pay a fixed cost
when they change their price. In contrast, Burstein
(2002) assumes that firms pay a fixed cost for changing
price plans. Once they pay this cost, firms can choose
not only their current price, but also a plan specifying
an entire sequence of future prices. A key property of
these models is that small and large changes in mon-
etary policy have qualitatively different effects on
aggregate economic activity.
While state-dependent models seem very promising
(at least to us), they are substantially more difficult to
work with than time-dependent models. In addition,
the two classes of models generate similar results for
many policy experiments that are relevant in moderate
inflation economies such as the U.S.2 For these reasons,
modern variants of Taylor and Calvo models continue
to play a central role in the analysis of monetary policy.
This article addresses the question: Are time-de-
pendent models good models in an empirical sense? For
concreteness, we focus on the Calvo sticky pricing mod-
el. In principle, there are a variety of ways to test this
model. For example, one could embed it in a fully spec-
ified general equilibrium model of the economy. This
would involve, among other things, modeling house-
hold labor and consumption decisions, credit markets,
fiscal policy, and monetary policy. If in addition, one
specified the nature of all the shocks impacting on the41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
economy, one could estimate and test the model using a
variety of statistical methods like maximum likelihood.3
Another strategy would be to assess the model’s pre-
dictions for a particular shock, such as a disturbance
to monetary policy or a shock to technology.4
Here, we focus on tests of the model using the
econometric strategy pioneered by Hansen (1982) and
Hansen and Singleton (1982) and applied to the Calvo
model by Gali and Gertler (1999) and Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2003). The idea is to exploit the fact that in any
model incorporating Calvo pricing, certain restrictions
must hold. One can test these restrictions, without mak-
ing assumptions about other aspects of the economy.
Of course, in the end, we need a fully specified model
of the economy within which to assess the consequences
of alternative policy. The approach that we discuss here
has the advantage of focusing on the empirical plausi-
bility of one key building block that could be an ele-
ment of many models.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we summarize the Calvo model. Standard versions
of the model assume that when firms reoptimize their
price plans, the new plan takes effect immediately. As
in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), we allow for the
possibility that when firms reoptimize their price plans
at time t, the new plan only goes into effect at time
t + τ, where τ ≥ 0 and a time period corresponds to a
quarter. The standard Calvo model corresponds to the
assumption that τ is equal to zero. By varying τ, we
can vary the information set that firms have at their
disposal when making new price decisions.
The following section discusses an econometric
strategy for estimating and testing the model, taking into
account the possibility of measurement error in the vari-
ables of interest, particularly inflation. Then, we dis-
cuss the four measures of inflation that we use in our
empirical analysis, as well as our measure of marginal
cost. Finally, we present our results, drawing heavily
from Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.
First, using postwar U.S. time-series data, we find strong
evidence against the standard Calvo model (τ = 0). This
is true regardless of whether we allow for a structural
break in monetary policy in the early 1980s, which a
number of researchers argue occurred with the onset
of the Volker–Greenspan era. Second, once we allow
for a lag between the time that firms reoptimize and
the time that they implement their new plans (τ > 0),
the model is no longer rejected. Third, allowing for
measurement error in inflation also overturns the re-
jection of the standard Calvo model (τ = 0). For reasons
we discuss below, we are more comfortable with the
second of the two resolutions.
Consider first the possibility that τ exceeds zero.
If we use the full post-1959 sample period, we require
that τ = 2, that is, firms set prices two quarters in ad-
vance, to avoid rejecting the model. Frankly, we are
skeptical that there is a six-month delay between when
firms reoptimize their price plans and when they ac-
tually implement the new plan. So we do not view this
as a plausible way of overturning the evidence against
the standard Calvo model. Fortunately, once we allow
for a break in monetary policy, the required value of
τ arguably drops to one, which seems more reasonable
on a priori grounds.
Turning to the other resolution, we find that even
with independently and identically distributed (iid)
classical measurement error, there is only marginal
evidence against the standard Calvo model using the
whole sample period. Once we allow for a break in
monetary policy, we find virtually no evidence against
the model. In addition, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that firms reoptimize prices, on average, once
a year. This seems reasonable in light of the assump-
tions usually made in the literature. Of course a key
question is: How large is the measurement error re-
quired to overturn the rejection of the model? We quan-
tify the size of the measurement error using a variety
of statistics. Our own view is that for the gross domes-
tic product (GDP), Consumer Price Index (CPI), and
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator-
based measures of inflation, the size of the required
measurement error is reasonable, according to a variety
of metrics documented in the article. We tentatively
conclude that there is little evidence against the restric-
tions implied by the Calvo sticky price model.
The Calvo model of sticky prices
As discussed in the introduction, there are a variety
of ways to model nominal rigidities in goods prices.
Here we discuss the model of price setting associated
with Calvo (1983). Since our objective is to derive the
testable implications of this model per se, we do not
embed it within a general equilibrium framework.
At time t, a final good, Yt, is produced by a per-
fectly competitive firm. It does so by combining a con-
tinuum of intermediate goods, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]
using a constant returns to scale technology. We let
Pt and Pjt denote the time t price of the final and in-
termediate good j, respectively. Profit maximization
implies that the demand for intermediate good j is a
decreasing function of the relative price of that good
and an increasing function of aggregate output, Yt.
The intermediate good j ∈ [0,1] is produced by a
monopolist that uses the following technology:42 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
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where 0 < α < 1. Here, Ljt and kjt denote time t labor
and capital services used to produce the jth interme-
diate good, respectively. Intermediate firms rent capi-
tal and labor in perfectly competitive factor markets.
The variable At denotes possible stochastic disturbances
to technology.
Profits are distributed to the firms’ owners at the
end of each period. Let st denote the representative firm’s
real marginal cost, that is, the change in an optimizing
firm’s real total cost associated with increasing output
by one unit.5 Given our assumptions, marginal costs
depend on the parameter α and factor prices, which











where Pjt is firm j’s price.
We assume that firms set prices according to a
variant of the mechanism spelled out in Calvo (1983).
In each period, a firm faces a constant probability,
1 – θ, of being able to reoptimize its nominal price.
So, on average, a firm reoptimizes its price every
(1 – θ)–1 periods. For example, if a period is one quarter
and θ is 0.75, the firm reoptimizes on average once a
year. We assume for simplicity that the firm’s ability
to reoptimize its price is independent across firms and
time. For now we leave open the issue of what infor-
mation set the firm has when it resets its price.
A standard assumption in the literature is that if
the firm does not reoptimize its price, it updates its price
according to the rule:
1 2) , jt jt PP − =π
where π is the long-run average gross rate of inflation
(see, for example, Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000,
and Yun, 1996).6
As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001),
we interpret the Calvo price-setting mechanism as cap-
turing firms’ response to various costs of changing prices.
The basic idea is that in the presence of these costs, firms
fully optimize prices only periodically and follow
simple rules for changing their prices at other times.
Let  t P !  denote the value of Pjt set by a firm that can
reoptimize at time t. Our notation does not allow  t P !
to depend on j. We do this because, in models like ours,
all firms that can reoptimize their price at time t choose
the same price (see Woodford, 1996, and Yun, 1996).
The firm chooses  t P !  to maximize the expected present
value of profits. We suppose that the firm sets  t P !  on
the basis of the information that it has at time t – τ.
When τ = 0, the firm sees the realization of all time
t variables when resetting its price. We refer to this
version of the model as the standard Calvo model. The
assumption that τ > 0 is similar in spirit to the model
in Mankiw and Reiss (2002), who think of firms as
having flexible prices but “sticky” information sets.
Alternatively one can imagine that resetting prices is
a costly time consuming event for managers, so that
prices must be set τ periods in advance. Given our as-
sumptions, if the firm can reset its prices every peri-
od, then it would set its price,  , !
t P  equal to a markup
over the expected marginal cost conditional on infor-
mation at t – τ.
Log linearizing the first-order condition of the firm
around the relevant steady state values, we obtain:
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Here, Et–τ denotes the conditional expectations opera-
tor. For example,  ˆ tt Es −τ  denotes agents’ expectations
of  ˆt s  conditional on the information that they have at
time t – τ. In addition,  , tt t pP P = ! !  and a hat over a
variable indicates the percent deviation from its steady
state value.
As noted by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2001), several features of equation 3 are worth em-
phasizing. First, if inflation is expected to be at its
steady state level and real marginal costs are expected
to remain constant after time t, then the firm sets
ˆ ˆ . tt t pE s −τ = !  Second, suppose the firm expects real mar-
ginal costs to be higher in the future than at time t.
Anticipating those future marginal costs, the firm sets
ˆ
t p !  higher than  ˆ . tt Es −τ  It does so because it understands
that it may not be able to raise its price when those
higher marginal costs materialize. Third, suppose firms
expect inflation in the future to exceed its steady state
level. To avoid a decline in its relative price, the firm
incorporates expected future changes in the inflation
rate into  ˆ . t p !
It follows from well-known results in the literature










=− θ + θ π 

!43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
where λ ∈ [1,∞) is a parameter that controls the
degree of substitutability of intermediate goods in
the production of the final good. Log linearizing this
relation and using it in conjunction with equation 3
implies that inflation satisfies: 8
() ( ) 1 ˆˆ ˆ 5) 1 1 . tt t t t EE s −τ + −τ θπ = βθ π + −βθ −θ
While equation 5 is the focus of our empirical analy-















Relation 6 makes clear a central prediction of the model:
Deviations of inflation from its steady state depend
only on firms’ expectations of current and future de-
viations of real marginal cost from its steady state value.
So for example, in the short run, the growth rate of
money, interest rates, or technology shocks affects in-
flation only by its effect on real marginal costs. In the
long run, the rate of inflation depends on the average
growth rate of money.
Assessing the empirical plausibility
of the model
Here, we discuss the limited information strategy
for testing the Calvo sticky price model pursued by
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003), among others. The basic idea is to focus on
the testable restrictions of the Calvo pricing model, while
leaving unspecified other aspects of the economy.
To derive the testable implications of the Calvo
model, it is convenient to define the random variable.
() ( ) 11 ˆˆ ˆ 11 . tt t t s ++ ψ = θπ −βθπ − −βθ −θ  
Note that agents that reoptimize their price do so on
the basis of their time t – τ information. The other prices
that affect the time t inflation rate were already set on
the basis of information before time t – τ. This means
that inflation is predetermined at time t – τ. In princi-
ple, there are a variety of ways to test this assumption.
For example, we could test whether any variable dated
between time t – τ and t has explanatory power for
time t inflation.
Here, we test this implication indirectly. Since
ˆ t π  is in agents’ time t – τ information set, equation 5
can be written as:
7) Et–τψt+1 = 0.
Relation 7 implies that the error agents make in fore-
casting the value of ψt+1 when they reoptimize prices
at time t – τ is uncorrelated with the information that
they have at their disposal. Suppose that the k × 1 vec-
tor of variables Xt–τ is in agents’ time t – τ information
set. Below, we refer to these variables as instruments.
Then relation 7 implies the system of k equations:
8) Et–τψt+1Xt–τ = 0.
This in turn implies that the unconditional covariance
between ψt+1 and X t–τ is equal to zero:
9) Eψt+1Xt–τ = 0.
Relation 9 provides us with a way to estimate the
parameters of the model. Moreover, if the dimension
of Xt–τ is greater than the number of parameters to be
estimated, we can use these restrictions to test the model.
To discuss our procedures for doing this, it is useful
to recognize the dependence of ψt+1 on the unknown
value of (θ,β) by writing equation 9 as
10) E [ψt+1(θ,β) Xt–τ] = 0.
Hansen (1982) provides conditions under which
equation 10 can be used to consistently and efficiently
estimate (θ,β) using generalized method of moments
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Here T denotes the size of our sample. We also denote
the true value of (θ,β) by (θ0,β0). The vector gT(θ,β)
is a consistent estimator of E [ψt+1(θ,β) Xt–τ]. The val-
ue of E [ψt+1(θ,β) Xt–τ] is in general not equal to zero
except at (θ0,β0). We estimate the parameter vector
(θ0,β0) by choosing (θ,β) to make gT(θ,β) as close to
zero as possible in the sense of minimizing
11) JT = gT(θ,β)′WTgT(θ,β).
Here, WT is a symmetric positive definite matrix that
can depend on sample information. Also the prime
symbol (′) denotes the transpose operator. A given choice
of WT implies that we are choosing (θ,β) to minimize
the sum of squares of k linear combinations of the
elements of gT(θ,β).
Hansen (1982) shows that the choice of WT that
minimizes the asymptotic covariance matrix of our
estimator depends on the serial correlation properties44 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
of the error term ψt+1(θ,β). In Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003), we show that the exact serial correlation prop-
erties of this error term depend on the value of τ. For
example, if τ = 0, then our model implies that ψt+1(θ,β)
is serially uncorrelated. For τ ≥ 1, then ψt+1(θ,β) has a
moving average representation of order 1. One does
not have to impose this restriction in constructing an
τ – 1 estimate of WT.10 However, as we describe below,
whether one does so has an important impact, in prac-
tice, on inference.
Hansen proves that the minimized value of the
GMM criterion function, JT, is asymptotically distrib-
uted as a χ2 random variable with degrees of freedom
equal to the difference between the number of uncon-
ditional moment restrictions imposed (k) and the num-
ber of parameters being estimated. We use this fact to
test the restrictions imposed by the Calvo model.
Allowing for measurement error
The previous discussion assumes that inflation and
real marginal costs are measured without error. We con-
clude this section by reviewing the results in Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2003) about how measurement error affects
the analysis. The possibility of measurement error in
inflation is of particular interest to us. This is because
a number of authors have noted that when they include
a lagged inflation term in objects like ψt+1, it enters with
a significant coefficient (see, for example, Gali and
Gertler, 1999, and Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). These
authors have interpreted this lagged term as evidence
of firms that do not have rational expectations. Mea-
surement error can provide an alternative interpreta-
tion of these findings.
There are well-known problems involved in measur-
ing inflation. For example, it is widely believed that
official CPI-based measures of inflation are biased due
to changes in product quality and the benchmark basket
of goods over time (see Shapiro and Wilcox, 1996).
These problems are particularly severe when measur-
ing rates of inflation over long periods. To the extent
that this bias is constant, it does not affect our analy-
sis. However, we must modify our econometric pro-
cedures to allow for time varying measurement error.
Here we discuss the implications of classical measure-
ment error.
Suppose that the econometrician has a measure
of inflation 
m
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We suppose that ut has a moving average representation
of order q, denoted MA(q), and that ut is uncorrelated
with πt and the other variables in agents’ information
set at all leads and lags. This latter assumption defines
what we mean when we say that ut is classical measure-
ment error. We continue to assume that agents see ac-
tual inflation.
To see how these assumptions impact our econo-
metric procedures, consider the case in which τ is equal
to zero and ut is iid (q = 0). The econometrician now
sees φt+1, which is a “polluted” version of the error term,
ψt+1, that is the basis of the estimation procedure. The
random variables φt+1 and ψt+1 are related as follows:
φt+1 = ψt+1 + θεt – θβεt+1.
While ψt+1 is uncorrelated with the elements of agents’
time t information set, φt+1 is correlated with  .
m
t π  Ac-
cordingly, measured time t inflation is not a valid in-
strument, that is, it cannot be included in Xt.
The presence of iid measurement error in inflation
also means that φt+1 has an MA(1) representation. This
affects the nature of the restrictions that the model im-
poses on the weighting matrix WT. In Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2003), we show how to estimate the volatility
of the error term relative to the volatility of φt+1, as well
as the contribution of measurement error to the volatil-
ity of measured inflation. This provides us with two
metrics for assessing the size of the measurement error.
We refer the reader to Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003) for a discussion of the more general case in
which ut has a higher order MA representation. For our
purposes, the key result is that when ut has an MA(q)
structure, then φt+1 has an MA(q + 1) representation
so that one must exclude q + 1 lags of inflation from
the list of instruments, Xt. This structure also affects
the restrictions that we can impose on the weighting
matrix WT.
We conclude this section by considering the pos-
sibility that real marginal costs are measured with a
classical measurement error term that has an MA(q)
representation. If τ = 0, then φt+1 will have an MA(q)
representation, and one must exclude q lags of real mar-
ginal costs from the list of instruments, Xt. Below, we
abstract from this source of measurement error and
refer the reader to Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) for
an analysis of this case.
Measuring inflation and real marginal cost
Next, we discuss the measures of inflation and real
marginal costs that we can use in our empirical analysis.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Inflation
Many different measures of inflation are of interest
to economists and policymakers. Given the abstract
nature of the Calvo model, there is no obviously right
measure to use in our empirical analysis. In light of
this, we considered four measures of inflation based
on four measures of the aggregate price level: 1) the
GDP deflator, 2) the price deflator for the nonfarm
business sector (NFB), 3) the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), and 4) the price deflator for personal consump-
tion expenditures (PCE).11 For each price measure, we
constructed a measure of quarterly inflation over the
period 1959–2001. In our empirical work, we measure
ˆT π  as the difference between actual time t inflation
and the sample average of inflation.
Our different inflation measures are displayed in
figure 1. As we can see, they behave in a similar manner
over long periods of time. Inflation was low in the
decade of the 1960s, then began a rapid rise with one
peak in the early 1970s and another in the late 1970s.
Thereafter, the different measures begin a long decline
to very low levels by 2001. However, there are im-
portant differences between them over shorter periods.
Since the Calvo model purports to account for move-
ments in inflation over short periods of time, it is im-
portant to assess the robustness of our results using
the different measures of inflation.
Real marginal costs
In our model, real marginal costs are given by the
real product wage divided by the marginal product of
labor. Given the production function we assumed in
equation 1, this implies that real marginal cost is propor-
tional to labor’s share in national income,  /() , tt tt WL P Y
where  t W  is the nominal wage. In practice, we mea-
sure  tt WL as nominal labor compensation in the non-
farm business sector and we measure  tt PY  as nominal
output of the nonfarm business sector. The variable
ˆt s  is then measured as the difference between the log
of our measure of labor’s share and its mean. This is
a standard measure of  ˆ , t s  which has been used by
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2001).
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) discuss possible
corrections to this measure that are appropriate for dif-
ferent assumptions about technology. These include
corrections to take into account a non-constant elasticity
of factor substitution between capital and labor and
the presence of overhead costs and labor adjustment
costs. In Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), we discuss
results for these alternative measures of marginal costs.
In addition we allow for the possibility that firms re-
quire working capital to finance payments to variable
factors of production. We argue in that paper that these
corrections do not affect the qualitative nature of the
results discussed below.
Panel A of figure 2 displays the log of our measure
of real marginal cost and inflation measured using the
GDP deflator for the sample 1959–2001. Notice that
from the mid-1960s on, these two time series co-move
positively. The bottom panel of figure 2 displays the
dynamic correlations between real marginal cost at date
t and inflation at date t – k, k = –4, –3, …, 4. Clearly,
inflation is positively correlated with past and future
marginal costs.
Empirical results
Now, we present our empirical results.
The standard Calvo model
We begin by analyzing results based on the standard
Calvo model, by which we mean the model described
above with τ = 0. In addition, we initially abstract from
measurement error in inflation. We consider two spec-
ifications of the instrument vector Xt. Let Zt denote the
six dimensional vector consisting of the time t value
of real marginal cost, quadratically detrended real GDP,
inflation, the growth rate of an index of commodity
prices, the spread between the annual interest rate on
the ten-year Treasury bond and three-month Treasury
bill, and the growth rate of nominal wages in the non-
farm business sector. This corresponds to the basic
set of instruments used in Gali and Gertler (1999).
In our first specification, Xt is given by
{}
1 1, , 0,1, 2, 3 . tt j XZ j −
′ ==
As we discuss below, there are reasons to think that such
a large set of instruments leads to misleading inference
about the plausibility of the overidentifying restrictions
implied by the model. With this in mind, we consider
a second set of instruments given by
{}
2 1, , . tt t XZ ′ =ψ
In Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), we report that it is
difficult to estimate β with great precision across the
different specifications considered. Here, we summa-
rize the results based on the assumption that β = 0.99.
Panel A of table 1, based on Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003), summarizes results when the standard Calvo
model is estimated using the instrument vector 
1. t X
We report our estimates of the parameter θ (standard46 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 1
Four measures of inflation
A. GDP deflator
percent


































error in parentheses) and the JT statistic (p-value in brack-
ets). The label L refers to the maximal degree of serial
correlation that we allow for when estimating the weight-
ing matrix WT. We consider two values for L: 1) L = 0,
which corresponds to the degree of serial correlation
in ψt+1 implied by this model, and 2) L = 12, the value
used by Gali and Gertler (1999). Both values of L are
admissible. But, by setting L to zero, we are imposing
all of the restrictions implied by the model. This may
lead to greater efficiency of our estimator and more
power in our test of the overidentifying restrictions.
From table 1 we see that the parameter θ is estimat-
ed with relatively small standard errors. In addition, the
point estimate itself is reasonably robust across the dif-
ferent inflation measures and the two values of L. The
point estimates range from a low of 0.84 to a high of
0.91. This implies that, on average, firms wait between
six and 11 quarters before reoptimizing their prices.
We hesitate to attribute too much importance to
these point estimates. It is true that when L = 12 there
is virtually no evidence against the model, at least based
on the JT statistic. This is consistent with results from
Gali and Gertler (1999). However, when we set L = 0,
the model is strongly rejected for three of the four in-
flation measures. In particular, the p-values for the non-
CPI based inflation measures are well below 1 percent.
Even in the CPI case, the p-value is 2 percent. Evident-
ly, imposing all of the relevant restrictions implied by
the model on the weighting matrix has an important
impact on inference.
Panel B reports results based on the instrument
vector 
2. t X  A number of results are worth noting. First,
our point estimates of θ are similar to those in panel A.
Second, comparing the JT statistics for L = 12 across
Note: Shaded areas indicate official National Bureau of Economic Research recession periods.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 2
GDP deflator inflation and real marginal cost
A. Inflation and marginal cost
percent
























B. Corr MC(t), Inflation(t–k)
percent
GDP deflator (left scale)
Real marginal cost (right scale)
k
the two instrument vectors, we find that there is more
evidence against the model with the smaller list of in-
struments. However, with the instrument list 
2, t X  the
model is still not rejected at conventional significance
levels for any inflation measure. Third, the model is de-
cisively rejected when we set L = 0. Regardless of
which inflation measure we use, the p-value of the
JT statistics is virtually zero. In light of these results,
in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), we stress the impor-
tance of working with the smaller instrument set and
imposing all of the model relevant restrictions on the
weighting matrix WT. For the rest of this article, we
confine ourselves to results generated in this way.
An important maintained assumption of the pre-
vious results is that it is appropriate to use the entire sample
period to estimate the model. In fact numerous observers
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.48 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
have argued that there was an important change in
the nature of monetary policy with the advent of the
Volker disinflation in the early 1980s. Moreover, it is
often argued that the Fed’s operating pro-
cedures were different in the early 1980s
than in the post-1982 period. Accordingly,
we reestimated the standard Calvo model
over two distinct subsamples: 1959:Q1–
79:Q2 and 1982:Q3–2001:Q4.
Table 2 reports the subsample results
(here L = 0 and the instrument vector is
2). t X  For the first sample period, there is
strong evidence against the model for at
least two measures of inflation. In partic-
ular, the p-values of the JT statistic ob-
tained using the NFB and PCE deflators
are virtually zero. There is somewhat less
evidence against the model when we use
the GDP and CPI deflator based measures
of inflation. Here the p-values are 0.04
and 0.02, respectively. In these cases, the
point estimate of θ is 0.84. Taking sam-
pling uncertainty into account, we would
not reject the null hypothesis that, on aver-
age, firms wait about a year before reop-
timizing their prices.
Turning to the second subsample, we
see that there is substantially less evidence
against the model. Here, the p-values as-
sociated with the JT statistics obtained us-
ing the NFB, CPI, and PCE deflators are
0.06, 0.22, and 0.10, respectively. The only
case in which we can reject the model at
the 1 percent level of significance is when
we use the GDP deflator to measure infla-
tion. Interestingly, our point estimates of
θ for specifications that are not strongly
rejected are similar across subsamples.
Again, taking sampling uncertainty into
account, we would not reject the null that,
on average, firms wait about a year be-
fore reoptimizing their prices.
Alternative timing assumptions
We now consider the results of esti-
mating the model assuming τ = 1 or τ = 2.
For these cases, our instrument list is giv-
en by 
2
1 t X −  and 
2
2, t X −  respectively. Panels
A and B of table 3, based on Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2003), summarize results for
these cases. We begin by considering the
full sample results. Two results are worth
noting here. First, the point estimates of
θ are similar across the different values of τ considered,
including τ = 0 discussed above. Second, when τ = 1,
the model’s overidentifying restrictions are decisively
TABLE 1
Estimates of the standard model, 1959:Q1–2001:Q4
L = 0 L = 12
Inflation measure θ θ θ θ θ JT θ θ θ θ θ JT
A. Instruments: {1,Zt, …, Zt–3}′
GDP deflator 0.89 49.4 0.91 13.2
(0.03) [0.001] (0.02) [0.95]
NFB deflator 0.86 41.1 0.86 12.8
(0.03) [0.01] (0.02) [0.96]
CPI 0.88 38.9 0.86 12.6
(0.05) [0.02] (0.02) [0.96]
PCE deflator 0.87 44.8 0.88 12.8
(0.02) [0.004] (0.02) [0.96]
B. Instruments: {1, Zt, ψt–1}′
GDP deflator 0.90 28.2 0.91 10.3
(0.05) [9e–5] (0.03) [0.11]
NFB deflator 0.84 30.6 0.85 8.8
(0.03) [3e–5] (0.03) [0.18]
CPI 0.88 30.1 0.87 10.1
(0.06) [4e–5] (0.03) [0.12]
PCE deflator 0.87 36.9 0.89 11.5
(0.04) [2e–6] (0.03) [0.07]
Notes: The JT statistics are distributed as χ² random variables with six and
23 degrees of freedom in panels A and B, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses. P-values are in brackets. GDP is gross domestic product;
NFB is nonfarm business; CPI is Consumer Price Index; and PCE is personal
consumption expenditures.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.
TABLE 2
Subsample estimates of standard model
1959:Q1–79:Q2 1982:Q3–2001:Q4
Inflation measure θ θ θ θ θ JT θ θ θ θ θ JT
GDP deflator 0.84 13.4 0.86 17.0
(0.04) [0.04] (0.04) [0.009]
NFB deflator 0.74 21.7 0.86 12.2
(0.03) [0.001] (0.04) [0.06]
CPI 0.84 14.8 0.86 8.21
(0.06) [0.02] (0.05) [0.22]
PCE deflator 0.83 22.6 0.85 10.4
(0.03) [9e–4] (0.04) [0.10]
Notes: The JT statistics are distributed as χ² random variables with six degrees
of freedom. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are in brackets. GDP
is gross domestic product; NFB is nonfarm business; CPI is Consumer Price
Index; and PCE is personal consumption expenditures.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
rejected. The p-value associated with the JT statistic cor-
responding to every measure of inflation is very small.
However, when τ = 2, there is very little evidence
against the model. In no case is the p-value less than
0.08. Our view is that this is somewhat of a Pyrrhic
victory for the Calvo model. It is entirely possible that
there is some delay between when firms reoptimize their
price plans and when they actually implement the new
plan. But, it is not clear that a six-month delay is a
credible assumption.
Consider next the results obtained over the sample
period 1959:Q1–72:Q2. A number of interesting findings
emerge. First, when τ = 1 the point estimates of θ are
substantially smaller than the corresponding estimates
obtained over the full sample. For example, with CPI
inflation, the point estimate of θ falls from 0.86 to 0.72.
Second, with the exception of NFB inflation, there is
only marginal evidence against the model when τ = 1.
Third, there is virtually no evidence against the model
when τ = 2.
Finally, consider the results obtained over the sam-
ple period 1982:Q3–2001:Q4. Notice that the point es-
timates of θ are larger than the corresponding estimates
obtained for the first subsample for all values of τ. Per-
haps more importantly, there is relatively little evidence
against the model with τ = 1 and virtually no evidence
against the model when τ = 2.
Viewed as a whole, these results indicate that the
Calvo model performs reasonably well if we allow for
a split in the sample period and for a lag of roughly
one quarter between when firms reoptimize their price
plan and when they actually implement the new plan.
Impact of measurement error in inflation
We now consider the results of estimating the model
allowing for the possibility that inflation is measured
with error of the form
12) ut = εt + γ1εt–1 + γ2εt–2 + … + γqεt–q.
The model is otherwise the standard Calvo model
(τ = 0). For each measure of inflation, we report results
for the minimal level of q, such that the overidentifying
restrictions of the model are not rejected at the 1 per-
cent level.
To motivate why this model of the measurement
could improve the model’s performance, figure 3 dis-
plays the basic Euler equation errors emerging from
the standard Calvo model estimated over the full sample
period. These errors are negatively serially correlated
TABLE 3
Alternative timing assumptions
Full sample 1959:Q1–79:Q2 1982:Q3–2001:Q4
Inflation measure θ θ θ θ θ JT θ θ θ θ θ JT θ θ θ θ θ JT
A. Prices chosen one period in advance
GDP deflator 0.87 22.8 0.78 13.3 0.82 15.1
(0.03) [8e–4] (0.04) [0.04] (0.02) [0.02]
NFB deflator 0.82 28.0 0.66 22.1 0.81 12.7
(0.04) [9e–5] (0.03) [0.001] (0.03) [0.04]
CPI 0.86 18.4 0.72 15.7 0.83 6.37
(0.04) [0.005] (0.03) [0.02] (0.04) [0.38]
PCE deflator 0.83 22.9 0.75 12.9 0.82 8.51
(0.02) [8e–4] (0.03) [0.04] (0.03) [0.20]
B. Prices chosen two periods in advance
GDP deflator 0.90 9.46 0.91 4.27 0.86 7.63
(0.05) [0.15] (0.04) [0.64] (0.04) [0.27]
NFB deflator 0.87 3.20 0.78 6.07 0.86 7.35
(0.06) [0.78] (0.06) [0.42] (0.04) [0.29]
CPI 0.86 10.8 0.81 5.02 0.85 4.08
(0.05) [0.09] (0.04) [0.54] (0.05) [0.67]
PCE deflator 0.88 7.72 0.84 5.28 0.88 3.52
(0.04) [0.26] (0.03) [0.51] (0.06) [0.74]
Notes: The JT statistics are distributed as χ² random variables with six degrees of freedom. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values
are in brackets. GDP is gross domestic product; NFB is nonfarm business; CPI is Consumer Price Index; and PCE is personal consumption
expenditures.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.50 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
(in all cases the first order correlation coefficient is about
–0.25) and are plausibly modeled with a low-order
moving average representation. As relation 12 indicates,
even iid measurement error can generate a time series
for φt that is negatively serially correlated.
Panel A of table 4 reports the results of estimating
the model, allowing for measurement error, based on
the full sample period. To help assess the magnitude
of the measurement error, the column labeled Γ1 reports
our estimate of the ratio of the variance of true infla-
tion to the variance of the measurement error. This is
one measure of the extent of measurement error in the
inflation data. Below we refer to Γ1 as the signal to noise
ratio in the inflation data. The column labeled Γ2 re-
ports our estimate of the percentage of the variance of
the composite error term φt due to classical measure-
ment error that is observed by the econometrician.
A number of key results are worth noting here.
First, for all measures of inflation, allowing for iid
measurement error overturns the strong rejection of
the standard model reported in table 1. Indeed, for the
GDP and NFB measures, the overidentifying restric-
tions cannot be rejected at even the 10 percent level.
For the PCE deflator, these restrictions are not reject-
ed at the 4 percent significance level. Second, taking
sampling uncertainty into account, our point estimates
of the parameter θ are reasonably similar to those re-
ported in table 1. Third, measurement error appears
to be more important for the NFB deflator. For the
GDP, CPI, and PCE deflators, the ratio of the variance
of true inflation to the variance of the measurement
error (Γ1) is 18.4, 13.7, and 19.5, respectively. Evident-
ly, the signal to noise ratio in these inflation measures



















































Note: Shaded areas indicate official National Bureau of Economic Research recession periods.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
roughly 7.43, so the signal to noise ratio is lower. The
percentage of the variance of the composite error term
observed by the econometrician due to classical mea-
surement error (Γ2) is 0.48, 0.45, and 0.46, for the GDP,
CPI, and PCE deflators, respectively. But for the NFB
deflator, this ratio is roughly 0.73. So based on either
the Γ1 or the Γ2 statistic, there appears to be more noise
associated with the NFB deflator.
Panels B and C in table 4 report our subsample
results. Note that for every measure of inflation, there
is virtually no evidence against the model in either sample
period, once we allow for even iid measurement error.
Our point estimates of θ are higher in the second sam-
ple period, implausibly so for the NFB deflator. But
taking sampling uncertainty into account, one cannot
reject the hypothesis, for any measure of inflation or in
either subsample period, that firms reoptimize prices,
on average, once a year (θ = 0.75).
Turning to our measures of the importance of
classical measurement error, a number of results are
worth noting. First, in the pre-1979 sample period,
the importance of measurement error, assessed using
either the Γ1 or Γ2 statistic, is highest for the NFB mea-
sure of inflation. Indeed, the value of the Γ2 statistic
is so high (0.80) that we are led to conclude that either
1) the NFB is a relatively unreliable measure of true
inflation in the first period, or 2) our model of mea-
surement error is implausible. Second, in the post-1982
sample period, NFB inflation has estimated measure-
ment error properties that are quite similar to those of
the GDP and PCE deflators. Third, there is a substan-
tial decline in the signal to noise ratio for all three of
the inflation measures in the second sub-
sample period.
Viewed as a whole, these results in-
dicate that allowing for classical measure-
ment error results is a large improvement
in the model’s performance.
Conclusion
This article discussed the empirical
performance of the Calvo model of sticky
goods prices. We argued there is over-
whelming evidence against this model.
But this evidence was generated under
three key maintained assumptions. First,
there is no lag between the time firms re-
optimize their price plans and the time they
implement those plans. Second, there is no
measurement error in inflation. Finally,
monetary policy was the same in the pre-
1979 period and the post-1982 period.
Drawing heavily from results in
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), we dis-
cussed the impact of relaxing each of these
assumptions. Relaxing the first and third
assumptions overturns the evidence against
the model, if we are willing to assume that
firms wait roughly one quarter before im-
plementing new price plans. Relaxing just
the second assumption by allowing for
iid classical measurement error is suffi-
cient by itself to render the evidence against
the standard Calvo model marginal. If we
relax both the second and third assump-
tions, we find virtually no evidence against
the model. Moreover, we find little evi-
dence against the view that firms reopti-
mize their prices, on average, once a year.
TABLE 4
Measurement error in inflation
Inflation measure θ θ θ θ θ JT Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ1 Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ2
A. Full sample
GDP deflator 0.91 10.3 18.4 0.48
(0.04) [0.11]
NFB deflator 0.90 9.54 7.43 0.73
(0.05) [0.15]
CPI 0.90 16.6 13.7 0.45
(0.06) [0.01]
PCE deflator 0.91 12.9 19.5 0.46
(0.04) [0.04]
B. 1959:Q1–79:Q2
GDP deflator 0.86 4.97 14.8 0.48
(0.04) [0.55]
NFB deflator 0.82 6.42 5.64 0.80
(0.05) [0.38]
 CPI 0.85 5.87 24.1 0.38
(0.06) [0.44]
PCE deflator 0.87 5.94 31.8 0.32
(0.05) [0.43]
C. 1982:Q3–2001:Q4
GDP deflator 0.92 6.39 3.10 0.59
(0.07) [0.38]
NFB deflator 0.93 6.14 4.27 0.47
(0.08) [0.41]
CPI 0.88 5.48 2.12 0.59
(0.06) [0.48]
PCE deflator 0.92 4.47 3.07 0.65
(0.09) [0.61]
Note: Γ1 is the ratio of the variance of the true inflation rate to the variance
of the measurement error component; Γ2 is the fraction of the variance of
φτ+1 due to measurement error. The JT statistics are distributed as χ² random
variables with six degrees of freedom. Standard errors are in parentheses.
P-values are in brackets. GDP is gross domestic product; NFB is nonfarm
business; CPI is Consumer Price Index; and PCE is personal consumption
expenditures.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from Haver Analytics.52 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1See for example, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
(2000), Gali and Gertler (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), and Yun (1996).
2For example, Burstein (2002) shows that for moderate changes
in the growth rate of money (less than or equal to 5 percent on a
quarterly basis), traditional time-dependent models are a good ap-
proximation of state-dependent models.
3See, for example, Ireland (1997) and Cho and Moreno (2002).
4See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) and
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2003), respectively.
5We do not index st by j, because all firms have identical marginal
costs.
6Others, like Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), and Woodford
(1996), assume Pjt = Pjt–1. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2001) also consider a dynamic indexing scheme in which Pjt = πt–1
Pjt–1. In Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003), we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the Calvo model under these alternative specifications.
7See, for example, Calvo (1983).
8For a proof of this, see Woodford (1996) or Yun (1996).
9The key assumption is that { } ˆˆ ,, tt t sX π  is a stationary and er-
godic process. We also require that k ≥ 2.
10That is, when constructing an estimate of WT, one could allow
for higher order serial correlation in the error term than the
theory implies.
11Detailed data sources are discussed in the appendix.
Our data are from the Haver Analytics database. For each
data series below, we provide a brief description and, in
parentheses, the Haver codes for the series used.
■ Price measures: GDP deflator is the ratio of nominal
GDP (GDP) and real chain-weighted GDP (GDPH);
nonfarm business deflator (LXNFI); Consumer Price
Index (PCU); and personal consumption expenditures
deflator (JCBM2).
■ Real marginal costs: Share of labor income in nomi-
nal output for the nonfarm business sector, which is
proportional to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’
measure of nominal unit labor costs divided by the
nonfarm business deflator (LXNFU/LXNFI).
■ Instruments: Quadratically detrended real GDP is
the residual of a linear regression of real GDP (GDPH)
on a constant, t and t²; inflation is the first difference
of the log of the price measures; the index of com-
modity prices is the Commodity Research Bureau’s
index of prices of all commodities (PZALL); the in-
terest rate spread is the difference between a compos-
ite of yields on interest rates on Treasury bonds of
maturity ten years and greater (FLGT) and the inter-
est rate on three-month Treasury bills (FTBS3); and
growth rate of nominal wages is the first difference
of the log of nominal compensation in the nonfarm
business sector.
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